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Abstract. In this paper we implement an eﬃcient non-parametric statistical
method, Random survival forests, for the selection of the determinants of
Central Bank Independence (CBI) among a large database of political and
economic variables for OECD countries. This statistical technique enables
us to overcome omitted variables and overﬁtting problems. It turns out that
the economic variables are major determinants compared to the political ones
and linear and nonlinear eﬀects of chosen predictors on CBI are found.
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1. Introduction
Several studies have examined the diﬀerences in inﬂation rates among coun-
tries pointing out the key role of the Central Bank Independence (henceforth
CBI). It is widely documented, that a higher degree of CBI is associated
with a lower inﬂation rate in developed countries and that society reduces
opposition to inﬂation and public pressure for an independent central bank
(Cukierman, 2008, 2013; Alesina and Stella, 2010 for a review). The balance
between ﬂexibility and credibility in monetary policymaking determines the
equilibrium degree of CBI in a country. At the same time, the trade-oﬀ be-
tween costs and beneﬁts in delegating the power to manage paper money may
depend on many aspects of the economy and on its institutional framework
(Alesina and Grilli, 1995).
The recognition of this fact has encouraged the study of the determi-
nants that inﬂuence the CBI among the variety of economic, social and in-
stitutional variables that cause changes in the degree of commitment of the
monetary policy1. A possible limitation in the selection of the relevant group
of variables from a large dataset is the omitted variables issue and overﬁt-
ting problems, as recently pointed out by Brumm (2011). Random Survival
Forests (henceforth RSF) (Ishwaran et al., 2008) gives us the ﬂexibility to
uncover complex data structures such as dealing with nonlinear eﬀects and
interactions among multiple types of variables while allowing for eﬀective
predictions due to the law of large numbers and its two-step randomization
approach.
The main contribution of the present paper is to analyze the importance
of a large number of economic, political and institutional determinants of
CBI. The selection of the most relevant factors from a complete list of 59
explanatory variables is done by RSF, allowing any kind of complexity. Our
results suggest that the economic variables are major determinants compared
to the political ones and that some of the predictors have a strong nonlinear
eﬀect on CBI.
2. Data and Methodology
Data on CBI (legal independence index) are from Polillo and Guillem (2005).
Economic variables are taken from IMF (2008) and World Bank (2008). The
political ones are taken from the DPI database (Keefer, 2006) of World Bank.
Our ﬁnal sample includes 59 variables, 24 OECD countries and spans from
1980 to 20032.
1See Fernández-Albertos, 2015, D'Amato, Pistoresi, and Salsano, 2009; Farvaque, 2002,
for an overview of the empirical studies on economic and political factors.
2Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
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The economic variables are the following. The world-wide component
in the business cycle (i.e. the correlation between the GDP growth in each
country and the world or US GDP growth)3; a dummy EMU taking the
value one in the 1998-2003 period for the countries that joined the European
Monetary Union after complying with the convergence criteria provided for
by the Maastricht Treaty; diﬀerent measures of inﬂation (i.e. current/past
inﬂation and past average inﬂation); various measures of development (i.e.
log real GDP total and real GDP growth rate)4.
The political factors are: variables relevant to the executive power, vari-
ables relevant to the parties that make up the legislative power, variables rel-
evant to the electoral rules, variables relevant to the stability of the political
system, variables relevant to the checks and balances system, and variables
relevant to the state form, for instance whether or not it is a federal state5.
To select the determinants of the CBI, we apply RSF which is an exten-
sion of Breiman's (2001) method. RSF is a highly accurate ensemble tree
method free of distributional assumptions with a uniﬁed approach for clas-
siﬁcation, regression and survival settings. Every tree in the forest is grown
from a bootstrap sample and a random subset of predictors is selected for
splitting at each node. RSF is data-adaptive, applicable to high dimensional
settings and it provides a theoretically justiﬁed concept for variable selec-
tion, known as minimal depth (Ishwaran et al., 2010). The minimal depth
is the average depth of the ﬁrst split for each variable over all trees in the
forest and it is used to assess a variable's predictiveness. A built-in thresh-
old, which is independent of a priori tuning of parameters, is provided for
variable selection6.
3. Empirical Results
Table 1 reports the ranked minimal depth (depth) of the selected variables
from RSF analysis of the CBI dataset. The model size turns out to be 10
for depth threshold equal to 6.08. Variable importance (vimp) is also pro-
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Holland, New Zealand, Norway, Por-
tugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, US.
3For the world GDP growth, we use a weighted average of the growth rates of the
economies in the sample with weights equal to the GDP levels in each country.
4Note that to reduce the endogenity problem, we use average GDP correlation 1960-79
to analyze the CBI 1980-91 and average GDP correlation 1980-92 to study the CBI 1992-
2003. Moreover, we use past average inﬂation 1960-79 and 1980-92 to analyze the CBI
1980-91 and CBI 1992-2003, respectively.
5Refer to the DPI database for a deﬁnition of each variable included. Note that we use
the same variable deﬁnitions when we comment the results.
6Computations were implemented using the freely available R-software package ran-
domForestSRC (RStudio Team, 2015, Ishwaran et al., 2007, 2016).
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vided conﬁrming depth ordering. The cumulative contribution of the selected
variables is computed from the normalized variable importance (vimpnorm)
(see Grömping, 2009). The variable emu, which mainly reﬂects a change in
the institutional design of monetary policy, accounts as a major determinant
(41% of the total variation in CBI), past average inﬂation, business cycles
synchronization and the degree of development for the 16%, 19% and 4%,
respectively, while political variables as a whole for the remaining 20%.
Furthermore, the marginal eﬀect of each selected variable on the CBI is
examined in Figure 1 and 2. Here the vertical axis displays the predicted
CBI, while each predictor is plotted on the horizontal axis. Results look as
follows. The dummy emu suggests that the participation to the Euro (emu
equal to 1 in Figure 1) implies a greater CBI: it encourages the individual
countries to change the institutional design of the monetary policy in view
of greater price stability.
Additionally, the predicted smoothed curves in Figure 2 suggest the preva-
lent positive or negative behavior of the selected variables towards CBI given
the mean predictor values of each country (ticks at the bottom). We rec-
ognize strong nonlinearity of the variable past average inﬂation (denoted by
averageinﬂ), with a dominant negative relation with the CBI (suggested by
the accumulation of points to the left side of averageinﬂ graph in Figure 2).
This fact supports the idea stressed by Cukierman (1992) that inﬂation leads
to the evolution of automatic accommodative mechanisms such as indexation
of contracts in the labor and capital markets to the general price level. So-
ciety reduces opposition to inﬂation and public pressure for an independent
central bank.
Then, an almost linear and positive behavior can be detected for the two
variables regarding synchronization of business cycles (world cycle and usa
cycle). In fact, the larger the size of the common component in the business
cycle in the countries, the larger the CBI. To understand this result, consider
that governments expect their economies to be in the same state of the worlds
(boom or slumps) as foreign economies. Governments in each country have
a strategic incentive to commit monetary policy in order to free ride on the
stabilization provided abroad and gain credibility at home. Hence, the larger
the correlation among shocks, the larger the incentives to commitment, i.e.
the larger the CBI (see D'Amato and Martina, 2005).
From the point of view of the inﬂationary bias approach to monetary
policy, the impact of per capita GDP is not clear-cut. We ﬁnd that the real
GDP per capita (logrealgdp) is linearly and positively linked to CBI. On the
one hand, a higher level of per capita income level entails a lower degree
of (real and ﬁnancial) market failures in the economy, a more eﬃcient ﬁs-
cal system and therefore a lower incentive to create inﬂation for the central
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banker. On the other hand, economic agents in high-income countries might
be better hedged against inﬂation; hence, their inﬂation aversion may be
lower (Campillo and Miron, 1997). Opposite eﬀects on the inﬂationary bias
in monetary policy entail opposite eﬀects on the incentives to precommit
monetary policy. We consider the real GDP per capita as an indicator of a
general measure of development. In Romer (1993) a larger per capita GDP
has a negative impact on inﬂation, i.e. lower inﬂationary bias. The reduced
inﬂationary bias lowers the incentive to commit with negative impact on the
level of independence of the central bank. Lane (1997) and Campillo and
Miron (1997) obtain a positive sign for the log per capita GDP on average
inﬂation. Hence, our outcome is not consistent with the commitment inter-
pretation of the results in Romer (1993), but it is in line with Campillo and
Miron's (1997) argument.
Also the relationship between political instability and the level of depen-
dence is not clear-cut in the commitment literature. On the one hand, the
high variability of the political environment may imply a lower ability to
achieve commitment of monetary policy through delegation to an indepen-
dent institution. On the other hand, a larger political instability may increase
the beneﬁts to commitment. From an empirical point of view, the relation
between political instability and CBI is ambiguous and it mainly depends
on the variable used to proxy instability. For example, Cukierman (1992)
predicts and empirically veriﬁes that a high level of party political instability
induces a larger level of independence, whereas the regime political instabil-
ity has a negative eﬀect on CBI7. Broadly speaking, the literature on the
political economy approach to CBI suggests that a politically heterogeneous
context (federal systems, strong systems of checks and balance, coalition
and multiparty governments) pushes for the adoption of independent central
banks (see Fernández-Albertos, 2015).
Among the political variables, we ﬁnd relevant the following: the mean
district magnitude (mdmh), the number of government and opposition seats
(numgov and numopp), the number of seats of the largest government party
and of the largest opposition party (gov1seats and opp1seats).
An increase in district magnitude induces a higher CBI, given the accu-
mulation of country-points in the ﬁrst bit of the curve. The rationale behind
this outcome is that an increase in district magnitude tends to increase the
number of parties and party system fragmentation (Rae, 1995); so that the
larger the heterogeneity in policy preferences, the larger the CBI.
7A partial list of similar studies, in which diﬀerent measure of political instability and
several indices of CBI are used, includes De Haan and Van't Hag (1995), Habibi and
Bagheri (1997) and Farvaque (2002).
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Series depth vimp vimpnorm
emu 1.444 0.028 0.408
averageinﬂ 3.012 0.011 0.158
world cycle 3.340 0.007 0.100
usa cycle 3.623 0.006 0.092
mdmh 4.259 0.005 0.069
numgov 4.705 0.004 0.051
logrealgdp 5.392 0.002 0.035
gov1seat 5.482 0.003 0.036
numopp 5.554 0.002 0.026
opp1seat 6.001 0.002 0.023
Table 1: Minimal depth and variable importance (denoted by vimp, vimpnorm when
normalized) obtained from RSF analysis of CBI dataset. The latter includes 59 variables
for 24 OECD countries and spans from 1980 to 2003, as described in Section 2. The
selection of 10 variables comes from a depth threshold equal to 6.08.
In the same direction goes the outcome on government and opposition
parties. The larger the number of government seats, which could imply a
larger number of governing parties, makes policy making diﬃcult and induces
a greater incentive to delegate to an independent central bank. A similar
argument holds for the number of opposition seats. Moreover, the larger
the ﬁrst government party, the smaller the CBI, while the larger the ﬁrst
opposition party, the greater the CBI. This is even more true when taking
into account the relative weight in term of seats' number of these two parties,
focusing on the nonlinear behavior in Figure 2. In fact, up to about 100 seats
the eﬀect on CBI is positive (resp. negative) for gov1seat (resp. opp1seat)
while it is negative (resp. positive) for a number larger than 100. Therefore,
in general, the larger the fragmentation of government or party system, the
larger the CBI index.
4. Conclusion
In this paper we implemented random survival forests to correctly identify
the main economic and political determinants of the CBI index. Some possi-
ble limitations of the linear regression framework, which is usually employed
to study this problem, have been overcomed using this technique. The anal-
ysis shows that the selected economic variables account for the 80% of the
variation in CBI, while the ones reﬂecting party system's fragmentation for
the remaining 20%. Particularly, two-third of the explained variation due
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Figure 1: Marginal eﬀect plot of the dummy variable emu on the CBI index.
to the economic group is attributed to external constraints, that is, interna-
tional business cycle and the participation to EMU. Both of them induce a
larger incentive to commit to an independent central bank.
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